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Abstract
This paper characterizes monetary and exchange-rate policies during
successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments by analyzing the OECD economies over
the period 1970 to 1998. We find that successful adjustments are almost always
preceded by large nominal and real exchange rate depreciations while unsuccessful
adjustments are preceded by revaluations and followed by depreciations. The extreme
adjustments of Ireland and Denmark in the 1990s fit this pattern of depreciation for
success very closely. Early depreciation is a significant and quantitatively important
predictor of the persistence of adjustment: each 1 percent of depreciation in the two
years preceding a fiscal adjustment leads to approximately 2 percent increase in the
probability of success. Since the size of the typical pre-adjustment depreciation is 5%,
this is an important effect. When compared to an indicator of the composition of the
fiscal adjustment, the reliance on spending cuts, the two variables have similar
quantitative impacts on the likelihood of persistence. Our results are robust to
alternative definitions of the depreciation period, the persistence of the adjustment, and
whether we use effective, DM or US$ exchange rates. Monetary policy does not play a
significant role in fiscal adjustments. Our results suggest that attaining persistent fiscal
adjustment within EMU is likely to become a more “costly” endeavor than it was
beforehand, as EMU members have adopted a single currency and therefore abandoned
the use of exchange rate policies vis-à-vis each other.
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21 Introduction
The literature on the effects of fiscal adjustments has experienced a revival in the
1990s. The unexpected consequences of several major adjustments that took place in
Europe in the mid-eighties renewed our interest in understanding the determinants of
successful fiscal adjustments. Sizeable fiscal contractions in Denmark and Ireland led to
expansions rather than recessions1, while a large fiscal expansion in Sweden in the early
nineties led to a severe recession. Whatever explains these economic outcomes, it is
something other than traditional Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. The literature on the
effects of adjustments has uncovered some empirical regularity. The size, persistence and
composition (in terms of spending cuts or tax increases) of the fiscal adjustment, as well
as the fiscal stance at the time of the adjustment, all seem to affect whether it will be
successful. However, a missing element in the explanation of successful adjustments is its
monetary side.
Several authors have pointed to the role of monetary policy and exchange rates
before and during adjustments. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) say “disentangling the
effects of wage moderation and the effects of fiscal variables on the supply side and the
cost of firms, versus the effect of the exchange rate is a critical next step to understand
the dynamics of fiscal adjustments.” Alesina and Perotti (1997) mention the role of
exchange rates explicitly when discussing avenues for further research: “A very
important policy decision concerns the policy mix which should accompany a major
fiscal adjustment, particularly the exchange rate policy. Several major successful
adjustments have been preceded by devaluations, but the same happened for some of the
unsuccessful ones. The question is whether a devaluation helps in determining the
success of the adjustment and its macroeconomic consequences.” In spite of being
recognized as important, the interplay of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies
during adjustments has not been studied yet. This is a particularly relevant issue for the
eleven European countries that have adopted a common currency by joining the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and thereby relinquished the conduct of
independent monetary and exchange rate policies.
The goal of this paper is to assess empirically the role of monetary and exchange
rate policies during fiscal adjustments. We add to the literature on fiscal adjustments in
three ways. First, we characterize the behavior of monetary and exchange rate policy,
before, during and after fiscal adjustments. By examining successful and unsuccessful
adjustments separately, we highlight the possible contribution of these policies for
success. Our second contribution is to test the importance of monetary and exchange rate
policy explicitly against the success factors that have been previously studied in the
literature. Thirdly, we suggest a theoretical explanation for the role of monetary and
exchange rate policy in successful adjustments.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Nominal and, especially, real exchange
rate depreciations before a fiscal adjustment significantly increase the probability that the
1 Respectively in 1983-86 and 1987-89, involving a cut in the deficit of 7.2% and 5.7% of GDP.
3adjustment will be successful in the sense that it will bring a permanent improvement in
the public finances. A one standard deviation increase in rate of depreciation of the real
exchange rate in the two years before a fiscal adjustment leads to 11 to 15 percent higher
chance of success. When compared with the composition effect, namely the impact of the
spending-tax composition of the fiscal adjustment, an exchange rate depreciation has a
similar quantitative effect since a one standard deviation increase in the spending share of
the adjustment leads to a 10 percent higher probability of success. Unlike the exchange
rate, monetary policy does not play a significant role in promoting persistence. Monetary
policy is expansionary, and significantly so, only after unsuccessful adjustments.
These results have important implications for the feasibility of fiscal consolidations in
the EMU. Since the ability to devalue the exchange rate is an important element in
bringing a fiscal adjustment to a successful end, fiscal adjustments in the EMU are less
likely to be successful. Because of the common currency, an EMU member that
undertakes a fiscal adjustment cannot devalue its currency with respect to its main trading
partners (the other EMU members) or unilaterally decide to devalue the Euro with respect
to the US Dollar or the Japanese Yen.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on fiscal
adjustments. Section 3 looks closely at three episodes of fiscal adjustments, highlighting
the role of monetary and exchange rate policies. Section 4 characterizes successful and
unsuccessful fiscal adjustments and empirically tests the role of monetary policy and
exchange rate devaluation in their success. Section 5 suggests a theoretical framework
that is consistent with our findings and discusses the implications for EMU. Section 6
concludes.
2 Fiscal Adjustments: Theory and Evidence
Fiscal adjustments have been the focus of the macroeconomic policy debate in recent
years. The members of the EMU, as well as other countries that hope to become members
in the future, have pursued large deficit reductions to satisfy the convergence criteria
mandated by Maastricht Treaty. Latin American economies have improved their budget
balances under the pressure of IMF conditionality and the threat of capital outflows.
A fiscal adjustment, defined as a reduction in the government primary budget deficit,
can result from a reduction in government expenditures or an increase in tax revenues.2
The theoretical implications of a fiscal adjustment on private consumption and output are
different in different models.3 Infinite horizon models predict that a permanent reduction
in government spending raises private consumption provided public and private
consumption have zero or positive substitutability: individuals’ permanent income
2 This corresponds to a change in the primary deficit. The total deficit may also be cut due to a reduction in
the interest paid on the outstanding stock of debt.
3 For a review of the theoretical literature on fiscal adjustments, see Giavazzi, Japelli and Pagano (2000).
4increases because current and future taxes are lower, thereby raising private
consumption.4
Changes in taxes that are not accompanied by changes in current or future public
spending have no effects on private consumption or investment: aggregate saving
remains unchanged, as changes in public saving lead to compensating changes in private
saving. This is the well know Ricardian Equivalence result, as in Barro (1974). Ricardian
Equivalence, however, holds only in a world where taxes are not distortionary,
individuals are not credit constrained and there is no uncertainty about future government
policies. If current changes in taxes signal future changes in public spending, as
suggested by Feldstein (1982), the temporal pattern of taxes has real effects in the
economy.
Fiscal adjustments have different effects in overlapping generation models of finitely
lived individuals. Cuts in public spending raise private consumption if matched by cuts in
taxes, but fail to do so if current taxes remain high. Similarly, changes in taxes lead to
changes in private consumption, whether accompanied or not by changes in public
spending.
Finally, Keynesian models predict that an increase in government spending has an
unambiguous positive effect on output: higher public demand raises production and
private spending, notwithstanding some crowding out with respect to private investment
due to higher interest rates. Wealth effects can mitigate or reverse this result, as
consumption and investment are negatively affected by a decrease in wealth. An increase
in taxes with a constant level of public spending, on the other hand, decreases private
consumption and interest rates. Investment goes up, but the overall effect on output is
negative. Once again, wealth effects mitigate output contraction.
A different class of models proposes that the effects of fiscal policy on output and
private consumption are non-linear and depend on the circumstances of adjustment.
Factors such as the size and persistence of the fiscal impulse, the level and growth of
public debt at the beginning of the adjustment as well as its composition may lead to
effects similar to those predicted by infinite horizon models. Blanchard (1990) presents a
model where the level of public debt affects the impact of the adjustment on the
economy. The effects of distortionary taxation are highly non-linear and households have
finite horizons. An increase in net taxes lowers private consumption if public debt is low,
but may raise it if public debt is high. This happens because higher current taxes delay
the date of adjustment, postpones the deadweight cost of adjustment to future generations
and thus increases the lifetime income of existing households.5 Other authors have
4 When private and public consumption are complements, the effects of spending cuts are more complex as
individuals will tend to reduce private consumption in response to a reduction in public consumption.
5 Sutherland (1990) proposes a similar mechanism. If an adjustment is expected when public debt reaches a
certain threshold, a rise in taxes when the economy is closer to the threshold delays adjustment and thus
may increase the lifetime wealth of finite-horizon households. Perotti (1999) proposes a model where some
households are liquidity constrained. A decrease in spending lowers consumption of liquidity constrained
households and increases that of unconstrained households. Which effect dominates depends on the ratio of
public debt to GDP: when it is high tax the positive effect on consumption dominates.
5pointed to the possibility of non-linear effects in public spending cuts. Small cuts in
public spending have Keynesian effects, while large cuts signal a change in regime and
thus lead to increases in private consumption. This has been suggested in Feldstein
(1982) and Drazen (1990); Bertola and Drazen (1993) propose a similar non-linearity on
the basis of an expected probability of stabilization that arises when spending reaches a
pre-determined threshold.6 Feldstein (1982) suggests that the magnitude of the fiscal
adjustment in itself may signal its persistence, leading to non-linear effects of the size of
the deficit cut on the economy.
A number of researchers have taken the question of whether fiscal adjustments can be
expansionary to the data. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) started this empirical
literature with the analysis of the Danish stabilization of 1983-86 and the Irish
stabilization of 1987-89. They conclude that, in both cases, the fiscal adjustments were so
large that private consumption increased in response to an upward revision of permanent
income’s estimates. Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) search for non-Keynesian
responses of national saving to fiscal policy and find them to be associated to large and
persistent fiscal impulses, especially during fiscal contractions, confirming the findings in
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996).
Another factor that has been associated with success of fiscal adjustments is the fiscal
stance at the time of adjustment. On one hand, Perotti (1999) has provided evidence that
the higher the level of debt (or the more rapid the growth of public deficits), the more
likely for the fiscal adjustment to have expansionary effects. On the other hand, Giavazzi,
Jappelli and Pagano (2000) find that a high or rapidly growing debt/GDP ratio does not
predict non-Keynesian responses to fiscal adjustments.
Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) and Alesina and
Ardagna (1998) classify fiscal adjustments on the basis of their ex post performance:
adjustments are successful if, three years down the road, the debt/GDP ratio has fallen at
least 5 percentage points. They find that composition matters: cutting spending rather
than raising taxes leads to more persistent improvements of public finances and is usually
accompanied by an increase in GDP. Conversely, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000)
find that composition matter, but in the opposite way: fiscal contractions are
expansionary if carried out by tax increases rather than spending cuts.
3 Some case studies
Earlier analyses of fiscal retrenchments in Ireland, Denmark and Sweden in the 1980s
concentrate on the size and persistence of the fiscal impulse, the level and growth of the
debt/GDP ratio, and the composition of the adjustments. These studies ask which of these
factors are important in making an adjustment successful or expansionary. While almost
all these studies suggest that monetary and exchange rate policies may have played a key
role in the adjustment, there is no systematic assessment of their importance. In this
6 The mechanics of the argument work in a way similar to the Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997)
arguments with public spending taking the role of taxes and public debt, respectively.
6section, we review these adjustment episodes highlighting the role of exchange rate and
monetary policy.
3.1 Ireland
From 1974 to 1983, Irish public finances had deteriorated steadily, bringing public
debt from 55% to about 95% of GDP. At the same time, the current account also
deteriorated, reaching a staggering 13.7% of GDP in 1981. The Irish authorities then
decided to pursue a fiscal adjustment. According to our definition of adjustment,7 Ireland
had three episodes of fiscal adjustment since the early 80s: 1983-84, 1987-89 and 1996.
The main features of these fiscal adjustments are summarized in Table 1. Of the three
adjustments, those in 1983-84 and 1987-89 were successful, while the 1996 adjustment
was not successful. In terms of the adjustment’s impact on output, the 1987-89 tightening
was expansionary as both potential and actual GDP growth rose during the adjustment
relative to the average of the two years before. The 1996 adjustment, on the other hand,
lowered potential but raised actual GDP growth, whereas the 1983-84 adjustment
lowered both growth rates.
The third and fourth rows of Table 1 report the size of the fiscal impulse for each
episode; these are, respectively, the average and total improvement in the primary
balance to GDP. The fiscal impulse in 1987-89 was the strongest and it coincided with
the peak in the public debt to GDP ratio. Row six in Table 1 reports the (average)
composition of the fiscal adjustment, indicating what fraction of the primary surplus
improvement was due to a reduction in government disbursements versus an increase in
tax revenues.8 Most of the fiscal improvement in 1983-84 came through cuts in
discretionary taxation, including increases in duties, VAT, a temporary levy on income
and new residential property taxes.9 The 1987-89 adjustment, on the other hand, relied on
massive reductions in government outlays, which fell from 50% to 38% of GDP in three
years. This sharp reduction in outlays was achieved by imposing a ceiling on public wage
increases, a lower replacement ratio for unemployment benefits and a severe cut of public
investments. The 1996 fiscal improvement came both from lower public spending and
higher tax revenues, mainly originating from higher income taxes on households.
Table 1 reports the developments in Irish monetary policy during the fiscal
adjustments, i.e. the difference in the average growth rate of M1 and the three years
before the stabilization. The fiscal tightening in 1983-84 and in 1996 were accompanied
by sharp contractions of the monetary aggregates, while that in 1987-89 by a monetary
expansion.
7 A fiscal adjustment is an improvement of the primary balance to GDP ratio of at least 1.5% in a single
year. An adjustment is successful if the changes in the deficit in the two years immediately after the
adjustment are zero or negative. In later sections we also consider a three-year definition of success.
8 A figure above 100% indicates that the cut in government spending was accompanied by a reduction in
tax revenues.
9 See OECD Economic Surveys, Ireland 1984/85.
7Table 1: Fiscal adjustments in Ireland
1983-84 1987-89 1996
Successful Yes Yes No
Average potential GDP growth differential -0.4 0.8 1.0
Average actual GDP growth differential -0.8 5 -1.1
Average primary surplus/GDP change 2.2 2.8 1.7
Total primary surplus/GDP change 4.3 8.3 1.7
Initial net debt/GDP 83.3 116.3 84.3
Composition 53.7 151.5 64.7
M1 growth differential -8.2* 6.3 -27
Total current account/GDP change 4.0 1.6 0
*: M3
Irish exchange rate policy played an important role in the fiscal adjustments:
successful adjustments were preceded and/or accompanied by large nominal and real
exchange rate devaluations, while the unsuccessful ones followed a period of nominal
and real exchange rate appreciation. Figure 1 shows the daily DM/Pound exchange rate
(the number of DMs for one Irish Pound) from March 13, 1979 until December 31, 1998;
a fall of the exchange rate is a devaluation of the Pound with respect to the DM. The
vertical lines indicate the beginning and end of each fiscal adjustment. Figure 2 shows the
monthly real effective exchange rate10 of the Irish Pound. A fall in the real exchange rate
identifies a real depreciation of the Irish Pound, namely an increase in competitiveness;
the vertical lines indicate beginning and end of each fiscal adjustment.
Up to 1979, the Irish Pound was linked to Sterling and in 1979 Ireland became a
member of the European Monetary System (EMS). Until 1983, Ireland adopted a middle
course in the various realignments of the system that resulted in depreciation (both in
nominal and real terms) against the DM and the Dutch Guilder but an appreciation
against all other currencies in the EMS. The realignment on March 21, 1983 was the
opportunity to correct this appreciation of the real exchange rate. The Irish Pound was
devalued by 3.5% with respect to the DM (see Figure 1), slightly more than the
devaluation of the other EMS currencies. Figure 2 shows that, as a result of the March
1983 realignment, the real exchange rate depreciated by more than 7% in the following
four months. The March 1983 realignment was also accompanied by a sharp reduction in
monetary growth and the announcement of a stronger commitment by the Irish Central
Bank to maintain the new parity between the Pound and the DM, in contrast to the earlier
policy of successive realignments since 1979. In fact, the DM/Pound exchange rate
remained unchanged until August 1986. As a result, inflation halved and short-term
interest rates were reduced from 16.3 to 13.2%. The boost to competitiveness and the
reduction in interest rates stimulated the demand for domestic products and investment,
thereby easing the stabilization considerably in 1984. GDP growth jumped from –0.2 in
1983 to 4.3% in 1984, business investment growth recovered from –11 in 1983 to –3% in
10 The real effective exchange rate is normalized to 100 in June 1982.
81984, and the current account/GDP ratio improved by 4 percentage points over the
stabilization (see the last row of Table 1).
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
Exchange rate policy was also important in the 1987-89 stabilization. But unlike
the 1983-84 adjustment where the devaluation was carried out after the consolidation had
started, the Irish pound was devalued by 8% against the German DM in August 1986,
well before the stabilization had started (see Figure 1). The devaluation offset the loss of
competitiveness suffered in 1985-86 due to the depreciation of the sterling.11 In addition,
a reduction in the rate of wage increase relative to the average for the main trading
partners and gains in relative productivity led to a sustained improvement in
competitiveness throughout the stabilization, as shown in Figure 2, that further improved
the current account. The credibility of the exchange rate commitment further reduced
nominal and real interest rates and gave a remarkable impulse to domestic investment:
business investment rose by 17% and household investment rose by 11% during the
adjustment.
The Irish pound was devalued by 7% against the DM during the 1993 attacks on
the EMS currencies that led to the widening of the currency bands. After 1993, the Irish
Pound slightly depreciated until March 1995; however, in the final stage of convergence
toward the EMU, it steadily appreciated both against the DM and the other European
currencies. As a result, Ireland’s real exchange rate appreciated by more than 10%
between 1993 and 1997. The fiscal tightening of 1996, although limited in size, was
unsuccessful and reduced real output growth from 11% to 7.4%. Because of the
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland could not devalue its currency and rely on
the impulse of external demand; interest rates, already low, did not fall any further.
3.2 Denmark
Denmark started running large and persistent current account deficits in 1973; its
cumulated current account deficit over the period 1973-82, i.e. the sum of the current
account balances, amounted to 30% of GDP, a level only exceeded by Ireland. At the
same time, Danish public finances had been deteriorating rapidly, bringing public debt
from 12% to 65.5% of GDP in 1982. As a result, over the same period of time, short and
long interest rates increased to reach 17% and 22%, respectively. With inflation just
above 10%, interest payments on the outstanding stock of public debt became a
significant burden on the budget and put pressure on the government to start a
stabilization program in 1983 that lasted until 1986. Denmark joined the EMS since its
creation in 1979.
In September 1982 the Social Democratic government resigned and was replaced
by a minority Conservative coalition government. The new government adopted a
sweeping stabilization that abolished the semi-automatic regulation of public sector
wages, put a freeze on public investment and unemployment benefits, and increased
11 The United Kingdom is Ireland’s principal trading partner.
9social security contributions, direct and indirect taxation.12 The main features of the
program are summarized in Table 2. The adjustment was successful and had an
expansionary effect on output; actual GDP growth increased on average by 2.6% and
potential GDP growth increased by 0.3% during the adjustment with respect to the
average of the two years before it. Business investment increased by 30% and household
investment by 20% at the beginning of the program, and they continued to grow on
average by 13% until 1986. The improvement in the primary budget was remarkable:
from 1983 to 1986, the primary budget/GDP improved by almost 14%. On average, half
of the primary surplus improvement came from lower government expenditures and the
other half came from higher tax revenues.
Table 2: Fiscal adjustment in Denmark
1983-86
Successful Yes
Average potential GDP growth differential 0.3
Average actual GDP growth differential 2.6
Average primary surplus/GDP change 3.5
Total primary surplus/GDP change 13.8
Initial net debt/GDP 65.5
Composition 51.0
M1 growth differential 7.7
Total current account/GDP change -1.4
Figure 3 shows the daily DM/Danish Krona exchange rate between March 1,
1979 and December 31, 1989. The central rate of the Danish Krona was devalued by
4.76% against the DM in September 1979, 4.76% in November 1979, 5.5% in October
1981, 3% in February 1982 and 4.25% in June 1982. These devaluations resulted in large
gains in competitiveness for Denmark over the period 1979 to 1982. Figure 4 shows
monthly data for the Danish real effective exchange rate between January 1979 and
December 1998; between January 1979 and December 1982, the Danish real effective
exchange rate depreciated by almost 17%. Hence, when the fiscal program got under way
in October 1982, Danish competitiveness was at an all time peak. Moreover, the fiscal
adjustment was accompanied by the announcement that exchange rate of the Krona was
going to be held fixed henceforth. The announcement gained credibility as the March
1983 realignment within the EMS led to a 2.5% revaluation of the parity of the Danish
Krona; competitiveness was not adversely affected because, in the same realignment, the
DM and the Dutch Guilder were revalued by 5.5% and 3.5% respectively.
An interesting feature of the Danish adjustment is that monetary policy was
expansionary during the consolidation. As Table 2 shows, M1 growth was on average
7.7% higher during the adjustment than in the two years before it. Nevertheless, the
12 See OECD Economic Surveys, Denmark 1982/83.
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combination of fiscal adjustment and credible exchange rate policy lowered inflation
from 10% in 1982 to 3.6% in 1986 and interest rates from 20% in 1982 to 10% in 1986.
External demand rose and the current account improved from –3.9% to –2.4% of
GDP in the first half of the adjustment thanks to early gains in competitiveness. As fiscal
tightening continued and the exchange rate was kept fixed against the low inflation
currencies in the EMS, the real exchange rate appreciated and the current account
worsened. The fiscal adjustment ended in 1987, having achieved to turn the budget
deficit into a surplus and to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio. In January 1987, the parity of
Danish Krona within the EMS was devalued by 0.45% and the current account started to
improve.
[Figures 3 and 4 here]
3.3 Sweden
Sweden embarked in two large fiscal adjustments in 1983-87 and 1994-96, which
are summarized in Table 3.13
The performance of the Swedish economy has deteriorated significantly since the
early 1970s. Real GDP growth decelerated markedly, productivity and industrial
production were well below the average in the industrialized economies. Like other small
open economies, such as Ireland and Denmark, Sweden developed an external problem.
The current account deficit deteriorated steadily since 1973 and at a faster pace in the
early 1980s due to terms of trade losses associated with the second oil price increases.
Meanwhile, the government budget position weakened sharply, which lead to a doubling
of public debt as a percentage of GDP from 1976 to 1982.
Table 3: Fiscal adjustments in Sweden
1983-87 1994-96
Successful Yes Yes
Average potential GDP growth differential 0.2 1.0
Average actual GDP growth differential 2.1 4.5
Average primary surplus/GDP change 2.1 3.8
Total primary surplus/GDP change 5.9 10.2
Initial net debt/GDP 66.3 83.9
Composition 252.4 86.5
M1 growth differential -3.3 0.3
Total current account/GDP change 3.4 4.5
13 The years 1985 and 1995 barely missed the threshold for being defined an adjustment according to our
definition. Since there was not a major change in policy in those years, we treat the years 85 and 95 as part
of the two fiscal episodes.
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The fiscal tightening of 1983-87 was successful and it first stopped, and then even
reversed the upward trend in public debt as a percentage of GDP. The new Social
Democratic government that took office in September 1982 embarked on a wide-ranging
program aimed at reducing central government expenditures.14 This is reflected in the
composition variable: the figure of 252.4% indicates that spending cuts while tax
revenues fell drove the fiscal adjustment of 1983-87. The adjustment was slightly
expansionary on potential GDP growth, but strongly expansionary on actual GDP
growth, with respect to the two years before the adjustment.
A key element of the 1983-87 adjustment was a 10% devaluation of the Krona in
September 1981 followed by a 16% devaluation in October 1982. The daily nominal
exchange rate between the DM and Swedish Krona over the period March 1979 to
December 1998 is shown in Figure 5. Sweden was pegging its currency, the Krona, to a
trade-weighted currency basket; the devaluations in 1976-77 had only made up partially
for the past cost and price differentials and did not provide Swedish firms with a
competitive advantage. The devaluation in September 1981 and especially that in October
1982 were designed exactly to bring resources to export sectors of the economy. In fact,
competitiveness improved by 30% during that period. Figure 6, which plots the Swedish
real effective exchange rate, shows the sharp depreciation right before the beginning of
the fiscal consolidation. Merchandise export volumes expanded rapidly and the current
account went from a deficit of 3.4 percentage of GDP in 1982 to a 0.7 surplus in 1984.
Monetary policy was tightened during the fiscal adjustment: M1 growth fell by 3.3%
against the two-year pre-adjustment average. Inflation more than halved by the end of the
fiscal adjustment (going from 8.5% to 4.1%), interest rates fell and investment grew
rapidly, both by business and household.
A strong recession hit Sweden and its main trading partners toward the end of
1990. This negative shock coupled with the fact that the real exchange rate had
appreciated by more than 20% since the devaluation in 1982 pushed Sweden into its
longest and deepest recession in post-war history. A large fall in property prices triggered
a crisis in the financial system that required a public bailout. More than half million
people lost their jobs, raising the unemployment rate above 8% in a country where it had
been on average well below 2%. At the same time, the government declared its intention
to seek full membership of the European Community and, in May 1991 pegged the
Swedish Krona to the ECU. In response to massive exchange-market pressure against the
Krona, the Central Bank allowed the Krona to float in November 1992. The primary
balance had deteriorated by 16 percent of GDP between 1990 and 1993 due to the
economic downturn, a tax cut designed to stimulate the economy and the government
bailout of the financial system.15
14 In particular, health insurance benefits, transfers to local authorities, rent subsidies and wages in the
educational system were reduced. See OECD Economic Surveys, Sweden, 1981/82.
15 For a detailed account of Sweden’s financial expansion in the early 1990s, see Giavazzi and Pagano
(1996).
12
A program to stabilize public finances was started by mid 1993; its main features
are described in Table 3. Following parliamentary elections in September 1994, the
Center-Right coalition government was replaced by a Social Democratic minority
government. The new government tightened fiscal policy with a mix of spending cuts,
higher taxes and social-security contributions and privatization. The adjustment was
successful and public debt fell by more than 10% of GDP over the period 1994 to 1996.
The stabilization program came at a peak of Swedish competitiveness. Figure 5 shows
that the Krona had depreciated by 23% against the DM since November 1992 and Figure
6 shows that, during 1993, the real effective exchange rate dropped by more than 30%.
As a result, external demand remained strong and the current account improved by 4.5%
of GDP over the period. The size of the fiscal adjustment was remarkable, as the primary
balance to GDP improved by more than 10 percent; nevertheless, falling interest rates and
rising asset prices stimulated private consumption and business investment. As a result,
the fiscal program was accompanied by strong output growth. The adoption of a 2%
inflation target for monetary policy and a stable Krona has lead to an appreciation of the
real exchange rate during the adjustment.
[Figures 5 and 6 here]
The fiscal adjustment episodes reviewed in this section present us with mixed
evidence on the importance that composition, size, and the fiscal stance at the time of the
adjustment have on the final success of the consolidation. As for the successful
adjustments, four of them were expansionary and one contractionary; three successful
adjustments originated by combined spending cuts and higher tax revenues while two
adjustments originated only by spending cuts. Three successful adjustments were
accompanied by monetary expansions while two of them by monetary contractions.
Public debt at the time of the adjustment ranged between 65% and 116% of GDP, both
for successful and unsuccessful episodes. By contrast, the evidence on the importance of
exchange rate devaluation appears more robust. Of the six episodes analyzed above, five
were successful and one unsuccessful. The unsuccessful adjustment, i.e. Ireland in 1996,
was the only episode not preceded by nominal and real exchange rate devaluation. In the
remainder of the paper we further investigate the importance of monetary and exchange
rate policies during fiscal adjustments.
4 Empirics
In this section we use national accounts data from OECD countries to study fiscal
adjustments. We summarize the behavior of macroeconomic variables around fiscal
adjustments using a very simple specification. We then estimate how different variables
proposed in the literature on fiscal adjustments as well as changes in the exchange rate
affect the likelihood of an adjustment being persistent.
4.1 Summary Statistics
We collected fiscal, monetary and output data on 20 OECD countries, to
characterize their behavior in periods just before, during and just after fiscal
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adjustments.16 The data set is provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Economic Outlook and covers the period 1970 to 1999. In several
forms, this data set is extensively used in the empirical literature on fiscal adjustments.
The data is provided has annual frequency and some fiscal variables are available
corrected for the cycle. Data on money supply is from the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics. In Appendix I we provide a complete description of the
data series, including sources, units and transformations.
First we divide the sample years into adjustment and non-adjustment years. A
period of adjustment is a year when the primary deficit is cut by 1.5 percent of GDP or
more. This definition is chosen to be in line with the definition used in several other
papers on the empirics of fiscal adjustments and is a rather stringent definition of fiscal
adjustment.17 Adjustment years are then subdivided into successful and non-successful
adjustments. We then classify a fiscal adjustment as successful if either the primary
deficit does not increase in the two years immediately after the adjustment or the level of
the public debt decreased by more than 3 percent, we consider the adjustment to be a
success. In all other cases, we classify the adjustment as non-successful.18 In our sample
there are 88 fiscal adjustments, of which 56 are successful and 32 are not successful.19
With the objective of describing the data, we ran fixed effects panel regressions of
the several macroeconomic variables of interest on their own lagged value and dummies
for periods just before, during and just after successful and non-successful adjustments.
As an example, in the case of GDP, the specification uses its lagged value and six
dummies, respectively for years before, during and after adjustments, successful and
unsuccessful. We take two years before and two years after a fiscal adjustment as the
before, after and during dummies for each and every year of a multi-year adjustment.20
The inclusion of fixed effects and lagged values makes sure that significant coefficients
on adjustment dummies capture deviations from the behavior of the variable, after time-
unvarying determinants and recent past behavior have been taken into account.
16 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and
the United States.
17 For instance, the sustained output expansion in the United States from the mid-1990’s, which has led to a
marked decrease in the budget deficit, does not, according to our criterion, display a single “adjustment
year” according to our criterion.
18 Note, however, that if governments allow the primary deficit to fluctuate with the business cycle so that
output contractions are accompanied by budget deficits, eventually most adjustments will “become”
unsuccessful. In other words, fiscal stabilization as gauged by our success indicator, is a temporary
phenomenon. We experimented with another definition of success, namely the one corresponding to a 3
year horizon and a 5 percent decrease in public debt. Most of the results, as we will mention at the
appropriate time, are not at all sensitive to this definition of success.
19 Out of the total 88 fiscal adjustments, 12 take place in two consecutive years and 6 in three consecutive
years. The success rate in the second and third consecutive years of adjustment is very similar to that in the
first year, around 66 percent.
20 The multi-year adjustments are classified as successful or non-successful according to whether the first
year of adjustment is a success or not. We obtained almost identical results for specifications that
considered only one-year adjustments and for specifications that consider each year of multi-year
adjustments as successful or non-successful on their own.
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Table 4 below presents the results for the different panels. In the first column we
report the coefficient on the lagged value of the dependent variable. As we can observe,
for the overwhelming majority of cases, this coefficient is highly significant, with t-
statistics typically in excess of 5. The behavior of most macroeconomic variables is
characterized by a high degree of persistence so that eventual significance of the dummy
variables on the timing and success of adjustments is a demanding benchmark. Our aim is
to assess whether the coefficients on the periods before, during and after adjustments are
significantly different from 0. GDP and consumption tend to be significantly below the
average growth rate in the sample just before adjustments. Controlling for lagged growth,
GDP and consumption grow by almost 1 percent less than average before successful
adjustments (columns (1) to (3)). The coefficient during successful adjustments is
positive, though not significantly different from 0. This indicates that the adjustments
have some expansionary effects. But part of the boom is temporary, as the after-
adjustment dummy coefficients are negative again, though smaller in size. In failed
adjustments there is no such reversal in GDP and consumption growth (columns (4) to
(6)). As to the current account, during successful adjustments the current account balance
moves significantly into surplus. The behavior of total investment and its components, in
particular business fixed investment, is remarkable: before adjustment, investment
growth is at 2 to 3 percent points below the average for the sample. Whereas during
successful adjustments there is a significant reversal and investment grows at 2 to 3
percent above average rates, during unsuccessful adjustments its growth is not
significantly higher than average. After failed adjustments investment collapses again,
significantly so in the case of business investment, while investment growth resumes
after successful adjustments. Housing investment also experiences a sustained boom
following successful adjustments and no change in behavior in failed adjustments.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the behavior of GDP and its components during and around
fiscal adjustment years.
[Figures 7 and 8 here]
The behavior of exchange rates, both nominal and real, delivers a clear-cut
picture. Successful adjustments occur after nominal and real devaluations, which
metamorphose into appreciations after the adjustment years. Unsuccessful adjustments,
display a different general pattern of exchange rate appreciation before and during the
adjustment and devaluation afterwards. The size of the average yearly devaluation before
successful adjustments is 2.3 percent for the nominal effective exchange rate, 1.8 percent
for the exchange rate with respect to the Deutsche Mark and 4.2 percent for the exchange
rate with respect to the US Dollar. The appreciation after these adjustments is also
sizable, though somewhat smaller. The behavior of the exchange rate is compatible with
the improvement in the current account balance during successful adjustments. Figures 9
through 11 present graphically the change in exchange rates (effective, nominal against
the DM and nominal against the US$) during the two types of adjustment. The difference
in behavior is noticeable.
[Figures 9, 10 and 11 here]
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Money and inflation have an interesting response to fiscal adjustment, as Figure
12 illustrates. There is no significant change in M1 or M2 before successful adjustments
but there is a crunch in M2-M1 immediately after successful adjustments. Inflation falls
before, during and after successful adjustments, but the change is significantly only after
the adjustment. In failed attempts at adjustment, there is a significant increase in M2
before adjustments, a cut in M1 during the adjustment years and finally the opening of
the monetary tap in the years following adjustments, with an increase in M1 by 4.2 above
its average growth rate. Consistently, for unsuccessful adjustments, inflation does not fall
significantly at any time.
Finally, the behavior of interest rates closes the characterization of the monetary
policy picture. Figure 13 shows that the nominal short interest rate falls immediately
before successful adjustments and its real counterpart after the adjustment years, together
with the nominal long interest rate. In contrast to successful adjustments, during and after
unsuccessful adjustments the signs on the dummies are overwhelmingly positive and
significant for the nominal interest rate during and the real long interest rate afterwards.
[Figures 12 and 13 here]
The overall picture suggests that exchange rate policy has a role in determining
the persistence (that is, the success) of fiscal adjustments. The real exchange rate presents
a clear pattern of devaluation before successful adjustments and appreciation before
unsuccessful adjustments. This pattern is present for real and nominal exchange rates, for
effective as well as for exchange rates against the DM and the US$.
Our results are consistent with the informal evidence on the importance of
exchange rate devaluations before and during fiscal adjustments presented by several
authors. For example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) mention that “several major multi
year fiscal adjustments are preceded by a devaluation of the exchange rate.” Alesina and
Perotti (1997) find that, though there are significant exchange rate depreciations before
all type of adjustments, the average depreciation before and during successful
adjustments is twice as high. In line with this, decreases in unit labor cost before
successful adjustments are twice as high on average than before unsuccessful
adjustments. They suggest: “the unit labor cost channel may even be more empirically
relevant than the wealth effects and credibility channels on consumption.” Finally,
consistent with a contribution of the depreciations to the success of adjustments, there is a
significant positive increase in the current account only during successful adjustments,
suggesting a surge in exports.21 Lane and Perotti (1998) present empirical evidence
21 See Table 10 in Alesina and Perotti (1997). The authors mention: “both successful and unsuccessful
adjustments have been accompanied and preceded by nominal depreciations, somewhat larger in successful
cases. However, significant depreciations accompanied unsuccessful adjustments as well. What is
interesting is that while in successful cases the nominal depreciations had an impact on competitiveness
(unit labor costs) in unsuccessful cases it did not. These observations suggest that the behavior of real
wages is significantly different in the two types of adjustments. As argued above, this difference may be
linked to the composition of the fiscal adjustment, and in particular to the difference in the behavior of
government wages and employment and taxes on households and social security contributions. The
evidence on the trade balance confirms the superior performance of net exports in successful versus
unsuccessful adjustments.”
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TABLE 4: Summary Statistics Before, During and After Fiscal Adjustments
Success Failure
Lagged
Dependent Before During After Before During After
Income and Its Components
GDP 0.40** -0.85** 0.36 -0.50* -0.44 -0.53 -0.16
11.99 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.40 0.32
Consumption 0.39 -0.84** 0.31 -0.34 -0.43 -0.39 0.05
11.16 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.44 0.35
Current Account 0.11* 0.34 0.65** -0.14 -0.09 0.07 -0.37
1.84 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.37 0.45 0.40
Total Investment 0.25** -2.90** 2.18** 0.86 -2.18** 1.23 -1.20
6.69 0.99 1.11 0.96 1.04 1.35 1.08
Housing Investment 0.20** -3.80** 1.68 -0.80 -0.09 -1.02 0.93
5.18 1.29 1.48 1.26 1.41 1.82 1.46
Business Investment 0.19** -3.01** 3.42** 1.74 -2.44** 2.38 -2.56**
4.98 1.10 1.27 1.10 1.21 1.57 1.25
Exchange Rates
Nominal Effective 0.28** -2.31** -0.69 1.15* 0.04 -0.17 -0.80
7.38 0.62 0.72 0.60 0.71 0.90 0.73
Nominal Deutsche Mark 0.30*8 -1.76** -0.63 -0.22 0.90 2.59** -0.68
8.01 0.77 0.90 0.77 0.87 1.14 0.91
Nominal US Dollar 0.34** -3.77** -0.13 3.24** 1.81 -0.99 -0.76
9.10 1.11 1.28 1.10 1.20 1.55 1.24
Real Effective 0.16** -4.20** -0.17 1.74 -0.55 1.36 -1.52
2.89 1.39 1.54 1.26 1.61 2.08 1.68
Real Deutsche Mark 0.26** -1.29 0.41 -0.56 1.93** 4.95** 0.68
6.87 0.81 0.94 0.81 0.91 1.20 0.96
Real US Dollar 0.29** -3.62** 0.59 3.11** 2.34* 0.44 -0.55
7.67 1.12 1.29 1.11 1.21 1.57 1.25
Money and Inflation
M1 0.04 -1.21 -0.14 1.25 0.31 -3.18* 4.23**
1.13 1.29 1.51 1.28 1.50 1.90 1.55
M2 0.35** 0.06 -0.61 -0.99 2.09** -0.62 0.09
7.80 0.90 1.05 0.88 1.03 1.32 1.02
M2 - M1 0.42** 0.45 -1.17 -2.71** 2.55* 0.28 -1.39
6.88 1.29 1.50 1.27 1.46 1.88 1.44
Inflation 0.84** -0.43 -0.43 -0.59** 0.42 0.25 -0.45
39.73 0.32 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.46 0.37
Interest Rates
Nominal Short Interest Rate 0.07* -0.65** -0.11 0.02 -0.25 1.05** -0.09
1.76 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.43 0.35
Nominal Long Interest Rate 0.19** -0.17 -0.03 -0.35** 0.07 0.06 0.10
5.00 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.20
Real Short Interest Rate -0.23** -0.17 -0.03 -0.35** 0.07 0.06 0.10
-5.49 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.20
Real Long Interest Rate -0.22** -0.34 -0.53 0.22 -0.08 0.67 0.99**
-5.77 0.38 0.44 0.37 0.45 0.58 0.46
Note: All variables defined in Appendix I – Data. For multi-year fiscal adjustments we have classified it as success or
non-success on the basis of the criteria for success for the first year. Below the value of the coefficient we present its
standard error. * and ** indicate a significant coefficient respectively at the 10% and the 5% confidence levels.
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showing that a fiscal adjustment leads to an expansion of exports and add that these
effects are “reinforced if the fiscal reform is accompanied by a flexible exchange rate or a
devaluation”.
4.2 Predicting Success in Fiscal Adjustments
We now turn to the determinants of successful adjustments. In this section we
attempt to affect the persistence of fiscal adjustments. We use a Probit specification, with
success as the dependent variable to be explained. Success is measured by a dummy with
value 1 in years when the primary deficit to GDP ratio decreases by 1.5 % and followed
by years when the primary deficit does not increase.22 The probability of success is
explained by lagged exchange rate changes as well as other variables suggested in the
literature.
Several adjustment characteristics have been associated with the likelihood of its
persistence in time. These adjustment characteristics are also associated with positive
impact on output. Thus, we now present factors likely to make fiscal contractions more
persistent and more expansionary. In a seminal paper examining the large fiscal
adjustments of the 1980’s in Denmark and Ireland, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) inferred
that the size of the adjustment had a role in reversing individual expectations regarding
future fiscal policy: large adjustments tended to be non-contractionary as regards output.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) later confirmed that the response of the private sector to cuts
in the deficit varied with the size of the fiscal impulse.23
One of the most robust results to emerge in the literature relates the composition
of the fiscal adjustment with its persistence. Alesina and Perotti (1995) first pointed that
if the cut in the deficit relies mostly on public spending cuts, it is more likely to be
successful and lead to output expansions. Specifically, successful adjustments are
associated with cuts in wage government spending and transfers, whereas non-successful
adjustments rely mostly on public investment cuts.24 As demonstrated by Alesina and
Ardagna (1998) and Alesina and Perotti (1995), the response of the private sector to the
adjustment depends on whether spending cuts or tax increases prevail.25
Several empirical studies have shown that fiscal adjustments may have
expansionary effects. Perotti (1999) examines adjustments in “good” and “bad” times,
the latter being periods when the level of public debt is high or rising fast. This author
finds that adjustments are more likely to be expansionary in bad times. However, in
contrast with these results, Giavazzi, Japelli and Pagano (2000) find no evidence that
22 Or the share of public debt in GDP decreases. We will use 2 and 3 years after the fiscal adjustment as
alternative criteria for success.
23 Giavazzi, Japelli and Pagano (2000) find a non-linear effect related to the size and persistence of the
impulse. Non-linearities are particularly apparent for the case of increases in net taxes and during fiscal
contractions.
24 Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) have confirmed these results.
25 All the above-mentioned papers explain the diverging effects with differences in credibility. Higher
credibility is associated to stronger positive private sector response.
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neither the level nor the rates of increase in public debt are good predictor of non-linear
responses.26
In this paper we use the empirical literature on fiscal adjustments to guide our
research on the role of exchange rates in determining success. Our benchmark
specification is:
Success (t) = α + β1*Exchange Rate (t-1, t-2) + β2*Level of Public Debt (t-1) +
β3*Change in Primary Deficit (t-2, t-1) + β4*GDP growth (t-1) + β5*Change in Spending
(t) + ε(t)
where (t) refers to the time period and (t-1,t-2) refers to averages of the time periods. The
main variable of interest is Exchange Rate (t-1, t-2), the growth in the exchange rate in
the two years preceding the adjustment.27 In Table 6 we present results for the sub-
sample of fiscal adjustments, whereas Tables 7 and 8 will present results for the whole
sample, including year and country dummies.
The control variables are:
- Level of Public Debt (t-1), that is, Government Net Financial Liabilities as
percent of GDP in the year preceding adjustment;
- Change in Primary Deficit (t-2, t-1), the change in the primary deficit in the
two years preceding adjustment;
- GDP growth (t-1), the rate of growth in real GDP the year before the
adjustment;
- Change in Spending (t), the contemporaneous change in primary public
spending, corrected for the business cycle.
The first two control variables capture the contention in the literature that in
periods of fiscal distress fiscal adjustment are more likely to be persistent. The inclusion
of GDP growth corrects for the phase of the business cycle at the time of the adjustment.
The change in public expenditure during adjustment captures the so-called composition
effect, the empirical fact that successful fiscal adjustments tend to rely on spending cuts
rather than tax increases.
Table 5 displays the results for the impact of lagged money supply growth on the
sample of adjustments. We use one and two-year lags of M1 and M2 monetary aggregates,
with and without the basic controls, and 2 and 3 year definitions of success. The
coefficient reported shows the change in the probability of success of an infinitesimal
change in the independent variable, evaluated at the sample mean. Below the coefficient,
we report robust standard errors and the t-statistic.28 As can be verified, money supply
26 Except in the case of developing countries and the rate of public debt accumulation.
27 In Table 5, where the effect of lagged money supply changes on the success of adjustment is examined,
we use changes in the monetary aggregates M1 and M2 instead of the exchange rate.
28 Robust standard errors use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance in place of the traditional
estimators. This variance estimator produces consistent standard errors even if the residuals are
heteroskedastic.
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Table 5: Predicting Successful Adjustments - A Few Simple Specifications
Money Supply
M1
Money Supply
M2
2 Year Definition of Success
1 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
Lagged Growth in Money Supply 0.00 0.0008
0.004 0.006
(0.00) (0.13)
Number Observations 89 72
Log L -58.68 -47.62
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00
2 Year Definition of Success
2 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
Lagged Growth in Money Supply -0.004 -0.005
0.006 0.008
(-0.62) (-0.66)
Number Observations 88 70
Log L -57.48 -45.95
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00
2 Year Definition of Success
2 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
With Controls
Lagged Growth in Money Supply 0.001 -0.002
0.007 0.01
(0.21) (-0.18)
Number Observations 71 56
Log L -41.34 -33.73
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.09
3 Year Definition of Success
2 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
With Controls
Lagged Growth in Money Supply -0.01 -0.02
0.008 0.01
(-1.51) (-1.44)
Number Observations 71 56
Log L -42.37 -34.95
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.08
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of the fiscal adjustment being a success for a 1 percent
change in the independent variable. The standard error and the t-statistic are presented below the coefficient. The controls used are the
rate of growth of real GDP and Gross National Public Debt as share of GDP a year before the fiscal adjustment; the total change in the
public deficit in the 2 years before the adjustment and the contemporaneous change in primary public spending corrected for the cycle.
The Lagged Change in Exchange Rate is the change in the exchange rate in the year before or the two-years before the adjustment,
where a positive value denotes an appreciation. * and ** indicate a significant coefficient respectively at the 10 % and the 5 %
confidence levels.
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never comes out as a significant predictor of success. With the exception of the last
specification presented, the t-statistics are unusually small so that the evidence is
overwhelming that money supply does not matter for success. In the last specification,
which uses the 2-year lag of money supply, with controls and the 3-year definition of
success, money supply becomes more important but remains non-significant. The negative
sign indicates that, if anything, monetary expansion diminishes rather than increase the
probability of success. Nevertheless, the small size of the coefficient in this and the other
specifications confirms that money supply is not a key variable in determining success.
In Table 6 we follow the same procedure and specification to examine the impact
of exchange rates on success, examining both nominal and real exchange rates, different
lags of the exchange rate (one year and two year),29 different definitions of success (two
and three years following the adjustment), with and without additional controls.30 For each
variable we present the percentage point change in the density function of a 1 percent
change in the right-hand side variable. As can be easily verified, the lagged growth in the
exchange rate is a robust predictor of success in fiscal adjustments. This is true for all
three exchange rates considered, independently of whether we use nominal or real
exchange rates (compare first three versus last three columns). The coefficient on the
exchange rate remains significant or close to significant irrespective of the lag used (first
two sets of results), the addition of controls (second and third sets of results) and the
definition of success (third and fourth sets of results). The only cases of significance
below the usual degree of confidence of 10 percent are the nominal effective and real
effective exchange rates when the 3-year definition of success is used. Overall, the results
are stronger for changes in real as opposed to nominal exchange rates.
The negative sign on the Lagged Growth of the Exchange Rate indicates that an
appreciation before a fiscal contraction is associated with lower persistence. The size of
the coefficient, ranging from 1.3 to 2.6 for the effective exchange rate, indicates that a 1
percent average depreciation in the years preceding fiscal adjustment leads to roughly 2
percent higher probability of success. In our sample, the standard deviations of the
nominal and real exchange rate depreciations before an adjustment is 5.55 and 5.72,
respectively. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in the rate of depreciation
before an adjustment leads to an 11 percent higher chance of success. Depreciation has a
statistically and economically significant impact on the persistence of fiscal adjustments.
Tables 7 and 8 present results for the whole sample and for EMU countries,
respectively. The results are robust and consistent with those in Table 5 so that the
coefficient on the exchange rate is negative throughout and significant or close to
significant. Remarkably, these results hold also for the US$ and DM exchange rates,
which are not reported here for reasons of parsimony. In Table 7, the coefficient is
significant at the 10% level for the sub-sample of adjustments but becomes highly
29 In all specifications, we used the second and third years of multi-year adjustments, appropriately defining
success for those years. We find that the results are weakened when only single year adjustments are
considered. However, throughout the specifications, the coefficient on the exchange rate variable is
negative and close to significance.
30 The coefficient and its significance for the control variables is not presented in Table 6 for lack of space.
These results are presented for the specifications in Tables 7 and 8 below.
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Table 6: Predicting Successful Adjustments - A Few Simple Specifications
Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate
Effective Deutsche
Mark
US Dollar Effective Deutsche
Mark
US Dollar
2 Year Definition of Success
1 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
Lagged Growth of Exchange Rate -1.65** -2.04** -0.72** -1.63** -2.80** -0.80**
0.83 0.79 0.38 0.90 0.78 0.42
(-1.97) (-2.53) (-1.89) (-1.79) (-3.53) (-1.91)
Number Observations 96 98 95 62 98 95
Log L -61.06 -59.84 -61.76 -37.94 -57.76 -61.71
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.03
2 Year Definition of Success
2 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
Lagged Growth of Exchange Rate -2.46** -2.23** -1.37** -2.65** -2.08** -1.67**
1.09 0.91 0.49 0.82 0.87 0.56
(-2.23) (-2.43) (-2.78) (-3.25) (-2.37) (-3.00)
Number Observations 95 98 95 58 96 95
Log L -59.17 -61.24 -59.45 -60.26 -61.25 -58.64
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08
2 Year Definition of Success
2 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
With Controls
Lagged Growth of Exchange Rate -1.83* -1.80* -1.06** -2.22* -2.43** -1.24**
1.16 0.95 0.54 1.38 0.88 0.61
(-1.56) (-1.88) (-1.93) (-1.62) (-2.77) (-2.04)
Number Observations 76 76 75 53 76 75
Log L -43.02 -42.62 -42.40 -29.79 -41.67 -42.25
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.14
3 Year Definition of Success
2 Year Lagged Exchange Rate
With Controls
Lagged Growth of Exchange Rate -1.29 -1.33 -1.26** -2.42* -2.61** -1.97**
1.09 0.95 0.60 1.32 1.00 0.67
(-1.18) (-1.40) (-2.09) (-1.82) (-2.59) (-2.92)
Number Observations 76 76 75 53 76 75
Log L -45.91 -45.66 -43.96 -28.53 -43.58 -41.91
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.18
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of the fiscal adjustment being a success for a 1 percent change in
the independent variable. The standard error and the t-statistic are presented below the coefficient. The controls used are the rate of growth of real
GDP and Gross National Public Debt as share of GDP a year before the fiscal adjustment; the total change in the public deficit in the 2 years
before the adjustment and the contemporaneous change in primary public spending corrected for the cycle. The Lagged Change in Exchange Rate
is the change in the exchange rate in the year before or the two-years before the adjustment, where a positive value denotes an appreciation. * and
** indicate a significant coefficient respectively at the 10 % and the 5 % confidence levels. For the whole sample, with year and/or country
dummies, the number of observations varies since years and countries for which there is no variance in the outcome are discarded. Thus, the
sample includes years and countries for which there are both successful and non-successful adjustments.
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significant for the whole sample. The size of the coefficient indicates that a one percent
depreciation leads to almost 2 percent higher chances of success in cutting the deficit.
The significance of the coefficients on nominal and real exchange rate depreciation
increases as country and year dummies are added. This is encouraging, as country and
year effects explain a good deal of adjustment persistence.31
As to other controls, the coefficient on the lagged change in the primary deficit
comes out as positive and significant, indicating that a sharper deterioration in fiscal
status makes it more likely that the fiscal adjustment will stop the increase in the deficit.
In contrast, the level of public debt before the adjustment tends to come out as non-
significant (the exception is the full sample with both year and country dummies). The
coefficient on lagged GDP growth is not significant for the most part. The corrected
change in public spending, on the other hand, affects the likelihood of success in a strong
and significant way. A one-percent change in spending increases the chances of success
by 10 percent. A comparison of the standard deviations of effective exchange rate
changes and changes in corrected spending, respectively 5.5 and 1.25 percent, indicates
that composition and exchange rate depreciation have quantitatively similar impacts on
the probability of success. The value of the log of the maximum likelihood function
indicates that the effective real exchange rate is a better predictor of success than its
nominal counterpart. The larger size and significance of the coefficient on the real
exchange rate, the decreased significance of the coefficients on fiscal status and size of
the spending cut, all suggest that the real exchange rate is the key variable in explaining
persistence.
Table 8 presents similar results for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The issue analyzed in this paper is particularly important for EMU member countries,
which have just abolished cross-country currency fluctuations by fixing the bilateral
exchange rates within their economic area, thus relinquishing control of the exchange rate
vis-à-vis their main trading partners. Even if for the sub-sample of adjustments in the
EMU (with small sample sizes) the coefficient on the exchange rate is not significant, its
sign indicates that a depreciation is correlated with increased likelihood of success.
Moreover, all right-hand side variables lose significance in the case of EMU, even the
lagged change in the deficit and the contemporaneous change in public spending. These
results are sensitive to the use of a 3-year definition of success, as well as to the exclusion
of the control variables.32.
The main conclusion is that all evidence suggests that exchange rate depreciations
before fiscal adjustments increase their persistence. The impact of depreciation on
success is quantitatively significant and consistent with the case-study evidence presented
in Section 3 above, as well as the priors expressed in the empirical literature on fiscal
adjustments.
31 Other variables also tend to gain significance in the specification with country and year dummies,
suggesting this is a sensible specification and should be taken as a benchmark.
32 We also have used one-year lags of exchange rate changes. The results for the whole sample of countries
are robust to this definition of lagged exchange rate change. For the sample of EMU countries, the
qualitative results remain but their significance is weakened.
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Table 7: Predicting Successful Adjustments
All observations - Effective Exchange Rate
Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged GDP Growth -0.01 2.41** 0.14 2.86** -3.07 1.59 0.88 3.73
2.40 1.26 0.66 1.52 3.92 1.86 1.22 2.85
(0.00) (1.96) (0.21) (1.91) (-0.78) (0.87) (0.73) (1.30)
Lagged Debt Level 0.14 -0.02 0.24** 0.86** -0.05 -0.06 0.14 0.69**
0.13 0.06 0.09 0.27 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.33
(1.10) (-0.31) (2.81) (3.30) (-0.27) (-0.78) (1.00) (2.14)
Lagged Change in Deficit 4.31** 1.81* 1.39** 4.12** 3.29 1.39 0.89 4.10**
2.13 1.07 0.58 1.39 2.46 1.32 0.76 1.69
(2.02) (1.74) (2.60) (3.22) (1.32) (1.07) (1.19) (2.56)
Change in Public Spending -10.52** -10.70** -4.68** -10.03** -1.41 -5.72* -5.56** -8.96**
5.25 2.41 1.31 2.75 6.74 2.97 2.00 3.96
(-2.02) (-3.94) (-3.68) (-3.54) (-0.21) (-1.82) (-2.68) (-2.15)
Lagged Growth Exchange Rate -1.83* -1.91** -1.16** -1.95** -2.23* -1.64** -1.33** -2.19**
1.16 0.43 0.26 0.61 1.38 0.44 0.35 0.68
(-1.56) (-4.56) (-4.07) (-3.30) (-1.62) (-3.75) (-3.60) (-3.25)
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Nr Observations 76 248 374 216 53 198 222 142
Log L -43.02 -91.06 -110.72 -73.25 -29.79 -74.54 -76.69 -50.63
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.37 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.36
Predicted P 0.64 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.66 0.18 0.16 0.25
Actual P 0.66 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.69 0.12 0.10 0.15
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of the fiscal adjustment being a success for a 1 percent change in
the independent variable. The standard error and the t-statistic are presented below the coefficient. Lagged Growth GDP is the rate of growth of
real GDP and Lagged Debt Level is the Gross National Public Debt as a share of GDP, both measured one year before the fiscal adjustment;
Lagged Change in Deficit is the total change in the public deficit in the 2 years before the adjustment (a positive value denotes an increase in the
deficit); the Change in Public Spending is the contemporaneous change in primary public spending corrected for the cycle; the Lagged Change in
Exchange Rate is the average change in the exchange rate (a positive value denotes an appreciation). * and ** indicate a significant coefficient
respectively at the 10 % and the 5 % confidence levels.
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Table 8: Predicting Successful Adjustments
EMU Countries Sample - Effective Exchange Rate
Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged GDP Growth -1.97 0.64 -0.68 -1.68 -10.89** -1.01 -0.79 0.64
2.86 1.50 0.84 1.61 5.23 2.74 1.22 1.50
(-0.69) (0.43) (-0.81) (-1.04) (-2.00) (-0.37) (-0.63) (0.43)
Lagged Debt Level 0.31* 0.03 0.12 0.19 -0.33 -0.04 0.18 0.03
0.21 0.10 0.13 0.38 0.28 0.08 0.19 0.10
(1.52) (0.29) (0.93) (0.51) (-1.14) (-0.46) (0.97) (0.29)
Lagged Change in Deficit 5.20 3.85 1.56 6.67** -1.49 1.21 -0.54 3.85*
4.48 2.28 1.08 2.41 5.48 2.22 1.20 2.28
(1.18) (1.48) (1.48) (2.66) (-0.27) (0.52) (-0.44) (1.48)
Change in Public Spending -3.58 -7.06** -3.10* -8.26** 19.64** 4.91 0.26 -7.06**
7.04 3.09 1.58 3.87 8.56 3.59 2.51 3.09
(-0.51) (-2.07) (-1.86) (-2.13) (2.18) (1.44) (0.11) (-2.07)
Lagged Growth Exchange Rate -1.98 -2.25** -0.68** -2.51** -5.72** -2.71** -1.50** -2.25**
1.63 0.62 0.40 1.13 2.60 0.87 0.52 0.62
(-1.22) (-3.34) (-1.62) (-2.20) (-2.18) (-2.86) (-2.91) (-3.34)
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Nr Observations 39 133 200 107 26 98 121 65
Log L -22.57 -48.48 -60.00 -39.08 -12.74 -33.14 -37.93 -25.16
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.28
Predicted P 0.59 0.17 0.12 0.21 0.58 0.15 0.12 0.23
Actual P 0.61 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.66 0.10 0.08 0.15
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of the fiscal adjustment being a success for a 1 percent change in
the independent variable. The standard error and the t-statistic are presented below the coefficient. Lagged Growth GDP is the rate of growth of
real GDP and Lagged Debt Level is the Gross National Public Debt as a share of GDP, both measured one year before the fiscal adjustment;
Lagged Change in Deficit is the total change in the public deficit in the 2 years before the adjustment (a positive value denotes an increase in the
deficit); the Change in Public Spending is the contemporaneous change in primary public spending corrected for the cycle; the Lagged Change in
Exchange Rate is the average change in the exchange rate (a positive value denotes an appreciation). * and ** indicate a significant coefficient
respectively at the 10 % and the 5 % confidence levels.
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5 Theoretical Framework and Implications for EMU
The stylized facts of successful and unsuccessful adjustments in OECD
economies can be summarized as follows. Large nominal and real exchange rate
devaluations precede successful adjustments. During a successful adjustment, investment
increases and the current account improves somewhat; after a successful adjustment,
nominal and real interest rates fall and inflation declines. As for money growth, the
evidence indicates that very little happens before and during a successful adjustment; the
only action comes from a reduction in the growth of deposits after the successful
adjustment is finished. Before unsuccessful adjustments M2 grows faster than it did on
average before the adjustment. We briefly describe a theoretical framework that
encompasses the stylized facts described above.
Consider a small open economy inhabited by infinitely lived agents who face a cash-
in-advance constraint: in order to purchase goods at time t, agents must acquire currency
in period t-1 sufficient to cover all consumption purchases. Each agent is a producer and
a consumer at the same time and she values private but not public consumption. There is
a central bank, that controls monetary policy by choosing the rate of monetary growth,
and a government that controls fiscal policy by choosing public spending and tax
revenues. Seignorage is one of the revenue sources in the government budget constraint:
a primary deficit can be financed by issuing bonds or by printing money or by a
combination of the two.
Suppose the government runs budget deficits and a goal-dependent central bank
partially finances them by raising money growth. In this setting, people anticipate that
future inflation will be high, causing nominal interest rates to rise. With a cash-in-
advance constraint, high nominal interest rates imply a high opportunity cost of holding
money, hence low consumption and production.
Suppose now the government announces a fiscal adjustment consisting of a
permanent reduction of public spending. At the same time, the central bank pegs its
exchange rate to a low-inflation currency and announces that its goal is to maintain the
peg. When pegging the domestic currency, the central bank chooses the parity that can
lead to depreciation or appreciation of the exchange rate. With a fraction of domestic
prices already set in the short run, a nominal depreciation implies real exchange rate
depreciation in the short run. These policies affect the economy in several ways. Provided
the central bank is really goal-independent and wants to maintain the new parity, by
choosing a visible nominal anchor such as the exchange rate, the credibility of the
program can be established more strongly and quickly. By refraining to devalue the
exchange rate, the central bank effectively transfers the control of its monetary policy to
that of the low-inflation country it has pegged its currency to. Hence, the central bank
will not be able to generate seignorage according to government demand. Public debt,
especially if high, constrains the government and forces it to cut primary deficits. In other
words, if deficits cannot be monetized, the government has no choice but make its ends
meet. As current and expected future inflation fall, both nominal and real interest rates
also fall and affect the economy in two ways. First, as the opportunity cost of holding
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money is lower, private agents consume more; hence, output also increases. Second,
investment goes up because the cost of borrowing is lower and consumption demand is
higher. Higher consumption and investment in capital, coupled with the fact that
production cannot increase much in the short run (because capital has to be sunk in one
period before), lead to a current account deficit. On the other hand, a real exchange rate
depreciation, because of sticky prices, leads to an improvement of the current account.
The final effect on the current account depends on which of the two effects prevails.
What are the implications of our results for EMU? The EMU has substantially altered
the conduct of monetary policy in Europe by creating a common currency and a
European Central Bank. Among the most conspicuous changes in the policy-making
framework in Europe are the fiscal mandates stipulated by the Pact for Stability and
Growth that accompany the monetary agreement.33 The institutional setting is thus
characterized by centralization of monetary policy while, in the fiscal sphere, national
autonomy is kept within the constraints dictated by the Pact. More formally, fiscal budget
deficits are mandated to be below 3% of GDP, to be exceeded only in case of deep
recessions, i.e. real GDP growth rates below –2% or, with the concurrence of the Council
of Ministers, below –0.75%. Countries with an excessive deficit that cannot be justified
are subject to mandatory deposits and fines if this fiscal excess is not corrected in two
years.
The combination of centralized monetary and decentralized, but constrained, fiscal
policy-making raises two questions, the second of which relates directly to our paper. The
first is whether countries are more or less likely to incur deficits in a monetary union. On
one side, the loss of monetary autonomy may increase the use of fiscal policy to respond
to asymmetric output shocks. Both factor and product market integration and the
statutory limits above effectively limit fiscal autonomy.34 Governments are likely to be
constrained by the diminished capacity to raise taxes due to increasing factor (namely
capital) mobility. In the past, governments in Europe have been able to place a substantial
part of their debt with their private banks; this situation may change in the future.
Moreover, lower seigniorage revenues harden the fiscal budget constraint on the fiscal
authority, even though seignorage revenues are typically small in OECD economies.
The second question, which is of special interest to us, is whether EMU countries
with excessive deficits are in a better position to correct those deficits than before EMU.
Our paper suggests they are not. As currency devaluation has been shown to accompany
successful, i.e. persistent, fiscal adjustments, it will be harder for individual countries to
correct fiscal imbalances in the EMU, which holds fixed the parities with the major
trading partners.
Eichegreen and Wyplosz (1998) look at the major recession in OECD countries and
find only seven instances of countries with deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP in the
33 For an overview of the history and the political and economic rationale of monetary unification in Europe
see Eichengreen (1993).
34 Obstfeld (1999) has underlined how fiscal and monetary policy will likely be more intertwined after
monetary union. “It is hard to believe that the Euro-11 club of EMU finance ministers will refrain from
forceful comment on ECB policy, including but not limited to exchange-rate developments. In its turn, the
ECB will surely weigh in on fiscal matters.
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period 1955-96. By examining the growth rate of GDP and the behavior of the budget
deficit, they indicate that these are “snap” recessions in that real GDP growth is negative
only for the year of recession and positive in all years immediately before and after. In
contrast, the budget deficit increases dramatically in the recession year and stays at values
higher than 3 percent of GDP for at least 3 years thereafter. This suggests that, even
though instances of exceeding the EMU deficit limits will be rare, if they occur, they are
likely to require discretionary fiscal policy measures. In this context, the abandonment of
the exchange rate as a policy instrument is an important loss, given its significant impact
on the persistence of the adjustment. Further evidence that EMU countries will find it
more difficult to undertake successful adjustments is given in Obstfeld (1999). Obstfeld
shows that most recent adjustments within the EMU are relying on tax increases
(sometimes temporary) and not on spending cuts, suggesting they may not be sustainable.
In fact, even the European Monetary Institute has expressed reservations about the
persistence of the fiscal adjustments undertaken in the build-up to monetary union.
6 Conclusions
There is a large literature on the determinants of successful fiscal adjustments and
their impact on output. These works have looked at fiscal policy alone, without
considering the role of monetary and exchange rate policies. This paper characterizes
monetary and exchange-rate policies during successful and unsuccessful adjustments and
studies their role in determining the success of a fiscal adjustment.
The results emerging from our empirical analysis for the OECD economies over the
period 1970 to 1998 can be summarized as follows. First, large nominal and especially
real exchange rate depreciations precede successful adjustments, whereas unsuccessful
adjustments are usually preceded by revaluations and followed by depreciations. Second,
nominal and real exchange rate depreciations are quantitatively important in predicting
success for fiscal adjustments: a 1 percent average depreciation in the years preceding
fiscal adjustment leads to a roughly 2 percent increase in the probability of success.
When compared to the composition of the fiscal adjustment, namely a measure of how
much the adjustment relies on cutting spending versus raising tax revenues, we find that
the two variables have similar impacts on the probability of success. Third, monetary
policy does not play a significant role in successful adjustments. There is evidence that
monetary policy is sharply contracted during and expanded after unsuccessful
adjustments; as for successful adjustments, however, monetary policy simply does not
change much, with the exception of a contraction in the growth of M2-M1 following a
successful adjustment.
These findings have important implications for the EMU. Some EMU members still
have high public debt to GDP ratios that require large interest rate payments and make
the fiscal constraints dictated by the Pact for Stability and Growth binding on them.
Hence, they need to undertake further fiscal adjustments. Our results suggest that a
successful adjustment within EMU will be more “costly” than they used to be outside
EMU, when countries could still devalue their exchange rates. To achieve a permanent
improvement of its fiscal position, an EMU member must rely entirely on the size and
composition of its fiscal reform.
28
This work is a first step toward an understanding of the role of monetary and
exchange rate policies during fiscal consolidations. Future work will hopefully shed light
on the channels through which exchange rate changes affect the success of a fiscal
adjustment and their quantitative importance.
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Appendix I: Data Sources
GDP- Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of real GDP, computed as the difference between the value
in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before.Unit: Percentage points.
Consumption - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of real private consumption, computed as the
difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
Current Account - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Change in the current account balance as a share of GDP
between the current and last year. A positive sign indicates an increase in surplus or a decrease in the deficit. Unit: Percentage
points.
Housing Investment - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of real investment in housing, computed as
the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
Business Investment - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of real business investment, computed as
the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
Total Investment - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of real total investment, computed as the
difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
Nominal Effective - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the nominal effective exchange rate,
defined as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year
before. A positive value denotes an appreciation of the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points.
Nominal Deutsche Mark - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the nominal exchange rate against
the Deutsche Mark, defined as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by
the value the year before. The exchange rate versus the Deutsche Mark was computed using the each currency’s exchange rate
against the United States Dollar and the US Dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange rate. A positive value denotes an appreciation of
the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points.
Nominal US Dollar - Source: OECD Economic Outlook Definition: Growth rate of the nominal exchange rate against the
United States Dollar, defined as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by
the value the year before. A positive value denotes an appreciation of the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points.
Real Effective - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the real effective exchange rate, defined as the
difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. A
positive value denotes an appreciation of the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points.
.
Real Deutsche Mark - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the real exchange rate versus the
Deutsche Mark, defined as the growth of the nominal exchange rate against the Deutsche Mark plus the growth in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) at home minus the growth of the Consumer Price Index in Germany. A positive value denotes an appreciation
of the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points.
Real US Dollar - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the real exchange rate versus the US Dollar,
defined as the growth of the nominal exchange rate against the US Dollar plus the growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at
home minus the growth of the Consumer Price Index in the United States. A positive value denotes an appreciation of the
country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points.
M1 - Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Definition: Growth rate of M1 monetary aggregate computed as the
difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
M2 - Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Definition: Growth rate of M2 monetary aggregate computed as the
difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
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M2 – M1 - Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Definition: Growth rate of the difference between M2 and M1
monetary aggregates, computed as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided
by the value the year before. Unit: Percentage points.
Inflation - Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Definition: Growth rate of the Consumer Price Index computed as
the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before. Unit:
Percentage points.
Nominal Short Interest Rate - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the short-term nominal interest
rate computed as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the
year before. Unit: Percentage points.
Nominal Long Interest Rate - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the long-term nominal interest
rate computed as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the
year before. Unit: Percentage points.
Real Short Interest Rate - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the short-term real interest rate
computed as the difference between the growth in the short-term nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation. Unit: Percentage
points.
Real Long Interest Rate - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Growth rate of the long-term real interest rate
computed as the difference between the growth in the long-term nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation. Unit: Percentage
points.
Lagged Debt Level - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Government Net Financial Liabilities as a Share of Gross
Domestic Product one year before the fiscal adjustment. Unit: Percentage points.
Lagged Change in Deficit - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Total change in the primary deficit as a share of
Gross Domestic product in the two years before the fiscal adjustment. A positive value indicates an increase in the public
deficit. Unit: Percentage points.
Change in Public Spending - Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Definition: Change, corrected for the business cycle, in the
level of primary spending as a share of GDP in the year of the fiscal adjustment. Unit: Percentage points.
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Figure 7
Investment Growth and Fiscal Adjustments
BefSuc
Suc
AftSuc
BefFail
Fail
AftFail
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
%
C
h
a
n
g
e
Total Investment
Business Investment
Figure 8
GDP Grow th and the Current Account in Fiscal Adjustments
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Effective Exchange Rates and Fiscal Adjustments
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Figure 10
Exchange Rate against the DM and Fiscal Adjustments
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Figure 11
Exchange Rate against the US$ and Fiscal Adjustments
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Figure12
MoneySupplyandFiscal Adjustments
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Inflation, Interest Rates and Fiscal Adjustments
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